that the status of individuals VIs-a-VIS the market becom es decommodified because their survival is n o lo nger contingent upon the scale of their labor power alone (Lawler, 567) .
The model works, with DelU11ark having the lowest Gini coefficient in the world and Sweden and Norway not far behind at four and six, respectively. Furthermore, N orway is rated as having the highest human development in the world, with Iceland, a country oft en associated with the Scandinavian model , ranked second, Sweden ranked fifth and D enmark coming in at 15th. As well , N orway D enmark and Sweden are ranked third fourth and fifth in overall employment , with Iceland being ranked nUlllber o ne. The success of the model is currently coming under press ure h owever, with new globa l markets emerging, and a strong European unity movem ent which threatens the very heart of the model. T he question then arises, in light of these pressures, can the Scandinavian m odel succeed in the new global econom y? If one looks into what makes the model strong, o ne can see that the answer is clearl y yes.
Before examining its involvement and future in the global economy, o ne IllUSt first understand the Scandinavian m odel and what makes it strong. The success of the m odel has prompted many other authors to question why Scandinavian countries have h ad such economic success. One explanatio n , although not written initially for the Swedish case, is bro ught by Joel S. Migdal in his boo k Strong Societies and Vii'ak Sta tes: State-Society Relations alld State Capabilities ill th e Third J;f/orld. In his work, Migdal argues that economic sll ccess is due in large part to a strong state control over the po pulace, arguing that ineffective state control, no matter how good policy is, will always fail to provide the adequate stru cture needed to form a strong econo m y:
.. . the distribution of social control in society m ay be am o ng numerous, fairly autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in the state. In other words, the over-all sum of authority m ay be high in the society, but the exercising of that authority may be fragm.ented. In this nH~lange, the state has been one organizatio n among many. These organizations-states, ethnic groups, the institutions of particular social classes, villages, and any other, have offered individuals the components for survival strategies (Migdal, (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) ).
Migdal's work fo cuses on the state, and the society and how they interact. N am ely for Migdal, the strength of the state is not only measured by its policies, but by its ability to enact these policies and to m ake the society reflect the leade rship of the state. While Migdal's writings are focused mainly o n explaining why the third world has struggled to develop, his arguments can be used to explain why there has been such a high level of success in Scandinavia. When analyzing Scandinavia through Migdal's argument, it is important to look at two elements, the state and the society. First we will start with the state because it is the more basic and evident of the two principles; however it is important to remember that both are integral to each other in the grand scheme of the argument. Migdal identifies three keys to effective state leadership, emphasizing a strong, well o rganized center as well as an effe ctive periphery represented by state and local officials:
First is the level of the central executive leadership. Besides its own particular policy agenda , its concerns include mobilizatio n of support, creating effective arms or agencies to carry o ut its will, resolving the conflicting notions of the 22 ROBBIE BLOCK Pitzer College that the status of individuals VIs-a-VIS the market becom es decommodified because their survival is n o lo nger contingent upon the scale of their labor power alone (Lawler, 567) .
First is the level of the central executive leadership. Besides its own particular policy agenda , its concerns include mobilizatio n of support, creating effective arms or agencies to carry o ut its will, resolving the conflicting notions of the http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/4 state's priorities among its agencies, and insuring its own political survival. Second is the level of the leadership in the central agencies of the state organization. These figures have their own personal and policy agendas; within their agencies they can use the power of appointment and patronage to forge a broad organizational view of the state's priorities. Finally, there are the state officials at the regional and local levels (Migdal, 263) .
The question then arises in exploring Scandinavia in light of Migdal's analysis; does the Scandinavian model fit the model of the strong state' And if so does it fit on all levels of the state that Migdal identifies? To answer this question, lets turn to Sweden as the model for the region because it is "credited with having invented the regIOn's social model" (Lawler, 5(8) .
SWEDEN AND THE MIGDAL THESIS
The Swedish ministry, which is second only to the Prime Minister, is famous for its equality and its being representative of the nation itself, with at times 11 of the 22 members of the cabinet being WOlnen. Furthermore, the cabinet is split amongst the four major political parties in Sweden, with the main party, the Party Centre, having eleven members on the cabinet. Under the cabinet falls the country's parliament (the Riksdag) which is made up of 349 members. Elections are held every four years and seats are won using a system of proportional representation -arguably the most representative form of a republic. Apart from the representativeness of the govermnent, it also falls into Migdal's model by being strong on every level and having a heavy influence on the lives and culture of its citizens. Sweden uses high rates of taxation and economic redistribution in order to ensure a society in which no one is left behind and the government is able to help ensure individual welfare through a vast array of social programs. This sets up a quasi dictatorship of the middle class in which people are funneled into a more common economic standing, which is seen as the most efrective form of state organization for an economy structured around full eluployment and controlled markets: "the dictatorship of the middle class is more efficient than the dictatorship of the elite" (Acemoglue, 515). This center based economy provides a strong framework for the government which is pervasive in most aspects of Swedish economic and social life. The government's effect on the day to day life of its citizens is seen in the social programs and care that it provides which tie the citizens to the state. Programs like state-run child care and universal healthcare allow the state to have a large influence on the Swedish society. Migdal argues that the effect of a state to alter and control a society as key to having a strong successful nation: "There was a driving compulsion to establish state social control within society, for that was the key that could unlock the doors in increased capabilities in the international arena" (Migdal, 23) . Furthermore, the ability of the prime nllnister to select his cabinet and the Sl1ull size of the cabinet makes it strong and able to act, a key to the first principle of a strong central government which Migdal argues is a necessity for a successful economy.
For Migdal however, the strength and organization of the state means nothing if the society is equally strong and pulling in a different direction. One of the strengths of the Scandinavian nations however is in their society. Scandinavian society is built on the same shared goals of universalism and exceptionalism, and is made up mostly of likeminded people:
state's priorities among its agencies, and insuring its own political survival. Second is the level of the leadership in the central agencies of the state organization. These figures have their own personal and policy agendas; within their agencies they can use the power of appointment and patronage to forge a broad organizational view of the state's priorities. Finally, there are the state officials at the regional and local levels (Migdal, 263) .
Rival Models to Capitalism
The Scandinavian states fo rm part of a very small group of genuine nationstates relatively unto uched by multi-ethnicity and l11ulti -culturalism and as such they are exceptional in ano ther sense .. .. This has been underpinned in all cases by comparatively high levels of public consensu s over core values and participatory dem ocra cy, as well as a thick model of citizenship (Lawler, 570) .
Scandinavian society also emphasizes a caring and welfare based system in which no o ne is left behind. This m odel of a strong aligned society very closely mirrors Migdal's ideal orderly non-fragmented society and is in bct key to even discussing the possibility of success:
The central political and social drama of re cent history has been the battle pitting the state and organizations allied with it against other social organizations dotting society's landscape. Altho ugh state leaders have aimed for ultimate uniform social control inside its boundaries, diverse heads of these o ther organizations have strived fiercel y to maintain their prerogatives . ... This struggle for social control must be brought into stark relief even before we can begin asking why som e states have succeeded in their drive towards predominance and others have not. (Migdal, (27) (28) .
Therefore, the very aligned, very homogeneous society of Sweden fits well with Migdal's model of a society that is not fragmented and not constantly being pulled in difre rent directions. In fact , the Swedish population is very close to that of the original population of Zionists in Israel which Migdal uses as his example of the model society. The alignment of Swedish society coupled with the government's pervasiveness in, and ability to change the society make Sweden a highly compatible m o del to Migdal's ideal case. This compatibility makes Migdal's explanation a very prevalent o n e for why Scandinavian countries are highly successful , however since his book was published in 1988 there have been several other authors o n the issue as well.
STRONG SOCIETY? THE FOlKHELM
One such author, who [ have already cited, is Peter Lawler, who has arguments that are very much in line with those of Migdal. Lawler also pins Scandinavian exceptionalism not on resource wealth or historical luck, but upon the organization of the state itself and the idea of conul1unity that is at the heart of Scandinavian society and culture: " The key feature of Scandinavian exceptionalism is the degree to which those policies have underpinned a close intermingling of public notions of COITU1lUnity, nation and state" (Lawler, 567). The center of these ideas Lawler points out is the Scandinavian sense of a shared burden in looking out for their fellow citizen's welfare:
The metaphor commonly employed by Scandinavian ideologists to capture this quality has been that of the folkhelm (people's home) .. .. ' per albin' [the father of Swedish social democracy] took what was originally a va gue conception of society, which emphasized national cohesion above all, and wedded it to a radical prog ramme of social reform such that the m etaphor was to become central to the preservatio n of social democratic hegemony throughout the region (Lawler, 568).
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Lawler seem s fa irly inline with Migdal in his view that Scandinavian society has much to do w ith their success, h owever the parallels continue w hen Lawler discusses his views o n the Scandinavian state. Lawler believes that the Scandinavian state not only refle cts the way the society thinks, but also that it helps to change and alter the society in the way that it wants the society to ac t, just like M igdal's model of success:
If we can agree that states va ry in their internal constitutio n -fo r example, in the relationship b etween the state and civil society, in the social values which guide and legitimate governance, or in the level of public consensus that lies b ehind internal and external policies (as well as the m anner in w hich such consensus is attain ed) -then it seems pla usible to suppose that these variations will impact to som e degree upo n the external orientatio n of the state (Lawler, 573).
To illustra te his point, Lawler looks to the m otivatio n behind m ost Scandinavian fo reign policy: unive rsalism . Lawler points out that universalism is both a cornersto ne of Scandinavian society and of the ideals of Scandinavian foreign rela tions, and the actual policies pursued are a fun ctio n of the actual societal desires that are expressed in votes and other m easures testing public legitimacy: " in other wo rds in which a degree of authentic refl ective m o nitoring of nati o nal policy takes place, foreign political and economic policy is lIIore likely subject to tests of public legitimacy" (Lawler, 573). T he actual physical em bodiment of this correlatio n between universalism o n both the societal and policy levels can be seen when o n e looks at the objection which m any of N orway's citize ns had to j oining the EU. The o ppositi o n pointed to the fact that the EU 's aid policy is fa r less generous than that o f N orway 's itself and was not inline with N orway's desire to help the third world in favo r of the global economic elites: SP [the party in o pposition to j oining the EU] argued for the continuing right to curb market m echanisms in pursuit of social valu es at the national level, full employment as a p olicy objective, ecologically-sustainable development and continuing solidarity w ith the T hird World against the development of a 'fortress E urope' . . .. Furthermo re, the EU 's aid policy was weighted towa rds the con cerns of do n o r states and the average amount of ODA as a percentage of GD P am ong M ember States was less than half of N orway's level (Lawler, (579) (580) .
T herefore, it is clear that o ne can see that Lawler's views of Scandinavian exceptio nalism are very much alike to Migdal's in that he emphasizes the strong state involvem ent and the highly aligned like minded society as key to N ordic sllccess.
SCANDINAVIA, GLOBALIZATION AND MIGRATION
In looking at Scandinav ian success through the lens of Migdal and Lawler and to test whether o r no t Migdal 's m odel applies to Scandinavia, it is im portant to look at the view of social scientists and economists of the changing dem ographics and societies of the countries. With inunig ratio n becoming m ore and m ore prominent in the western world it is impo rtant to look at the implicatio ns that immigratio n has o n Scandinavian Exceptionalism , especially in a state like Sweden which devotes much of its funding to every citizen of its nation: "focusing on the net fiscal effects, the gain from admitting immigrants
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In looking at Scandinav ian success through the lens of Migdal and Lawler and to test whether o r no t Migdal 's m odel applies to Scandinavia, it is im portant to look at the view of social scientists and economists of the changing dem ographics and societies of the countries. With inunig ratio n becoming m ore and m ore prominent in the western world it is impo rtant to look at the implicatio ns that immigratio n has o n Scandinavian Exceptionalism , especially in a state like Sweden which devotes much of its funding to every citizen of its nation: "focusing on the net fiscal effects, the gain from admitting immigrants Rival Models to Capitalism is computed for a welfare state with large expenditures and a large tax burden (Sweden) . .. an average new immigrant represents a new government loss of USD 20,500" (Storesletten, 487) . Sweden sees immigration as an investment, with annual immigration representing .67% of its population (Storesletten, 488) , the country invests money initially in welfare and training only to make returns in the future from increased tax revenue. Imnligration is seen as a delicate issue in Sweden because of its nature as a state which spends money on its citizens as opposed to one which is less focused on social programs: "these results suggest that imnligrants to a typical welfare state such as Sweden impose on average a substantial fiscal burden and are less beneficial for public cofiers than imnligrants to the US" (Storesletten, 504) . Apart from the purely economic strain on the social programs that immigrants have to Scandinavia, the question also arises as to whether or not the int1ux of imnligrants will cause Scandinavian culture and society to erode and cause a breakdown in the gentle balance between the countries society and state. While Storesletten does not give a direct answer to this question, he does give some insight when he points out that: "the labor market performance ofinmligrants in Sweden is poor, relative to natives" (Storesletten , 488) . While it is true that inunigrants will eventually pay ofi-their initial cost of social programs to the state in revenue taxes, whether or not their lower quality of work will go to lower the overall quality of work in Sweden is yet to be seen.
The question of immigration's effect on the Scandinavian economy brings us to yet another interesting crossroads when considering Scandinavia's roll in the global economy. In an age of increased integration and disappearing borders, can the Scandinavian model economy still succeed? Or will it be altered to fit into the new global order? In other words, will Scandinavian exceptionalism still be a trend even in tIus new era in which a country cannot help but be affected by global nurkets:
The relevant market today -is the planet Earth and the global integration of technology, finance, trade and information in a way that is int1uencing wages, interest rates, living standards, culture, job opportunities, wars and weather patterns all over the world (Friednun, 27).
Friedman views globalization as a dynanuc force for change and good, however the question remains on the table whether or not globalization is good for Scandinavia.
Globalization is characterized by the bridging of markets and the permeability of a nation's economy by the new global financial system that has characterized the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Therefore, by its nature, globalization requires some sort of norm that countries must follow in order to survive in the new integrated system, wluch Friedman deems "the Golden Straightjacket", whose roots he identifies with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan:
When your country recognizes this fact, when it recognizes the rules of the free market in today's global economy, and decides to abide by them, it puts on what I call the Golden Straitjacket. ... The Thatcherite-Reaganite revolutions came about because popular majorities in these two major Western econonues concluded that the old governmentdirected econonuc approaches simply were not providing sufficient levels of growth. Thatcher and Reagan combined to strip huge chunks of econonuc decision-making power from the state, from the advocates of the Great Society and from traditional Keynesian econonucs, and hand them over to the free market (Friedman, (104) (105) .
In other words, for Friedman, the Golden Straightjacket is the concept that free
is computed for a welfare state with large expenditures and a large tax burden (Sweden) . .. an average new immigrant represents a new government loss of USD 20,500" (Storesletten, 487) . Sweden sees immigration as an investment, with annual immigration representing .67% of its population (Storesletten, 488) , the country invests money initially in welfare and training only to make returns in the future from increased tax revenue. Imnligration is seen as a delicate issue in Sweden because of its nature as a state which spends money on its citizens as opposed to one which is less focused on social programs: "these results suggest that imnligrants to a typical welfare state such as Sweden impose on average a substantial fiscal burden and are less beneficial for public cofiers than imnligrants to the US" (Storesletten, 504) . Apart from the purely economic strain on the social programs that immigrants have to Scandinavia, the question also arises as to whether or not the int1ux of imnligrants will cause Scandinavian culture and society to erode and cause a breakdown in the gentle balance between the countries society and state. While Storesletten does not give a direct answer to this question, he does give some insight when he points out that: "the labor market performance ofinmligrants in Sweden is poor, relative to natives" (Storesletten , 488) . While it is true that inunigrants will eventually pay ofi-their initial cost of social programs to the state in revenue taxes, whether or not their lower quality of work will go to lower the overall quality of work in Sweden is yet to be seen. The question of immigration's effect on the Scandinavian economy brings us to yet another interesting crossroads when considering Scandinavia's roll in the global economy. In an age of increased integration and disappearing borders, can the Scandinavian model economy still succeed? Or will it be altered to fit into the new global order? In other words, will Scandinavian exceptionalism still be a trend even in tIus new era in which a country cannot help but be affected by global nurkets:
In other words, for Friedman, the Golden Straightjacket is the concept that free http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/4 flowing international capital and investo rs should be what determines state economic planning, no t traditional or idealist form s of economic thought: "There is just one global market today, and the only way yo u can grow at the speed your people want to grow is by tapping into the global stock and bond markets by seeking o ut multinatio nals to invest in your country and by selling into the global trading system " (Friedman, 112) . In order to see whether the Scandinavian m odel fits into the new global econo mic structure, it is impo rtant to first ide ntify what the stru cture actually entails. For the definitio n of the global economic stru cture we turn o nce again to Friedman, who lays o ut the system which is based upon simple neo-Iiberal approaches to !narkets:
To fit into the Golden Stra igacket a country must either adopt, o r be seen as m oving toward, the following golden rules: making the priva te sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state burea ucracy .. . deregulating its econom y to prom o te as mu ch do m estic competition as possible . .. o pening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition and allowing its citizens to chose from and array of competing pension options and foreign-run pensio n and mutual funds (Friedman, 105) .
Friedm.an's list continues and includes several other compo nents of an open market economy; h owever the above mentioned workings of the ideal globalized economy are eno ugh to see that the Scandinavian cases do not fit into Friedman's golden straigacket. With this in mind one may begin to wonder whether o r not the Scandinavian cases have a chance in the new globalized wo rld, or if their model of exceptionalis11l will slowly give way to the new global norm which has been created.
THE NORDIC MODEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
In looking at the Scandinavian cases, it is helpful to look first at their integratio n into a sm aller system., the new European Unio n, before looking at the larger global markets. It is also important to acknowledge that w hile Norway chose no t to integrate and join the European Union; Sweden decided that it was in its nations best interest to join the union, in looking at the arguments on both sides for and against joining, one can get a glilll.pse of what the future h olds for these countries.
First let us turn our attention to N orway, a country that said no to joining the European Union in 1973 and then again in a series of debates starting in 1993 . In fact, voter turnout was listed as the number one reason for voting by 65% of N orwegian's, in a contentious election in 1993 in which N o rway had an uncharacteristically divisive election with the issue of European integration at the forefront of the issues (Valen, 1994) . Coming up short of actual m embership, Norway has signed treaties with the European Union including the EU-No rway Free Trade Agreement in 1973, however there has not been ano ther con sideratio n for joining the unio n since the referendum failed in 1993 . T his can be accounted for by the Government's decision to suspend talks of joining the unio n for 10 years starting in 1993 (European Commission).
M o re interesting to study than the Norwegian case h owever for the implicatio ns of the new global system to the N ordic m odel is Sweden, not only because Sweden acce pted flowing international capital and investo rs should be what determines state economic planning, no t traditional or idealist form s of economic thought: "There is just one global market today, and the only way yo u can grow at the speed your people want to grow is by tapping into the global stock and bond markets by seeking o ut multinatio nals to invest in your country and by selling into the global trading system " (Friedman, 112) . In order to see whether the Scandinavian m odel fits into the new global econo mic structure, it is impo rtant to first ide ntify what the stru cture actually entails. For the definitio n of the global economic stru cture we turn o nce again to Friedman, who lays o ut the system which is based upon simple neo-Iiberal approaches to !narkets:
M o re interesting to study than the Norwegian case h owever for the implicatio ns of the new global system to the N ordic m odel is Sweden, not only because Sweden acce pted Rival Models to Capitalism membership into the European Union, but also because of Sweden's underperfonnance in the 1990's. Before looking at the European Union and Sweden's roll in the Europeanization of the region, let us look first at the country's financial failings in the mid 1990's. Between 1991 and 1994 the Swedish govenilllent was under control of a non-socialist government, which had major repercussions for Sweden's economic planning:
The economic problems, the employers' withdrawal from corporate cooperation and the subsequent electoral setback tor the Social Democrats in 1991 spelled trouble for those who looked to Sweden for guidance. Unlike its predecessors, the Swedish non-socialist goverJUllent that held office between 1991 and 1994 repeatedly rej ected the Swedish model, provoking media people and political ac tivists and since the early 1990's there has been continuous reporting about and calls for necessary repair work and remodeling (Byrkjeflot, 31) .
Byrkjeflot, a N o rwegian economist, goes on to describe the failings of the Swedish goverJUTlent as a misguided attempt to changing its rhetoric to " that of a European identity"(Byrkjeflot, 31), or in other words, to aligning with the European Union and its ideals. More specifically, the reforms of the dominant Conservative Party in 1991 were based upon neo-Iiberal economics:
... new Prime Minister Carl Bildt, had openly canvassed the dismantling of the Swedish Model. In his first Speech to the new Parliament, h e declared 'the end of the collectivist era', in Sweden, and his ' N ew Start' program promised tax cuts, the reduction and privatization of welfare provision (a 'revolution by choice') and revisions to Sweden's neutral security policy. A m ajor impetus for such changes was the bringing of Sweden into line with the rest of Europe (Lawler, 586).
These economic reforms did not work well for Sweden, and marked an era of economic downturn for the country. Sweden's recovery came with the return of the dominant Social Democratic Party (SAP) , and a return to the Scandinavian model , however w ith the transition came calls to join the European Union, which had grown considerably since the membership application was first lodged in 1991. T hose leading the charge to join the EU were the social elites, with the division clear especially in the SAP party, which is traditionally very stable. The division was between the leadership which supported joining the EU, and the women's and youth groups in the party which stood in firm opposition to m embership. For the most part however, support for joining the European Union was not based on a hope for future progress, but on a desire of staying a part of Europe, and with current economics and job considerations at the forefront of benefits to joining:
Those arguing for no thought Sweden should be a model in the old sense and an example to the world. Those saying yes ... did so with jobs and economics influencing their decision: don't let us be outside of Europe. No side argued for its position on the basis of a strong governing idea for the future. In other words, the manner in which the decision to apply for membership was made was itself symptomatic of an unraveling of the stable institutionalized, consensus culture that lay at the heart of the Swedish model which for decades has been 28 ROBBIE BLOCK Pitzer College membership into the European Union, but also because of Sweden's underperfonnance in the 1990's. Before looking at the European Union and Sweden's roll in the Europeanization of the region, let us look first at the country's financial failings in the mid 1990's. Between 1991 and 1994 the Swedish govenilllent was under control of a non-socialist government, which had major repercussions for Sweden's economic planning:
Those arguing for no thought Sweden should be a model in the old sense and an example to the world. Those saying yes ... did so with jobs and economics influencing their decision: don't let us be outside of Europe. No side argued for its position on the basis of a strong governing idea for the future. In other words, the manner in which the decision to apply for membership was made was itself symptomatic of an unraveling of the stable institutionalized, consensus culture that lay at the heart of the Swedish model which for decades has been http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/4 captured in the metaphor offolkhelm (Lawler, 583) .
Avoiding a turn away from the model has been a concern of the government since the 1970's when the Swedish economy suffered a severe downturn. Out of the recognition of a need to cope with global econOlnic changes, while still maintaining its core values and structure, came the Swedish third way or °Hcdjc VilgC115 Politik: "What analysts and policy makers from both sides of the political spectrum now agreed upon was that the SAP governments had tailed to tackle economic decline while preserving the core features of the exceptional state" (Lawler, 584). The question then is, can Sweden still find this third way in light of its membership in the European Union and the Monetary Union, or will the forces of globalization force Sweden and the rest of the Nordic community into the golden straight jacket? While it is too early to tell, one can make projections based upon historical examples and by testing the rival models to see if they are at all compatible.
In recent history, there has been an idea that out of Scandinavia will emerge a new global order, due to the Nordic ability to lead and adapt: "Thorstein Veblen, who saw the northern European countries as 'late developers' and as masters of adaptation .... Sweden and Scandinavia were perceived to be forming a vanguard in the inevitable march toward a new industrial society" (Byrkjeflot, (28) (29) . As Lawler points out however, the chances of the European Union adapting to the Scandinavian model are slim to none:
In spite of the strength of social-democratic sentiment within the European Parliament, the translation of social-democratic sentiment into the 'affective corporatism' that produced institutional developments and egalitarian outcomes in the Scandinavian states is unlikely in the EU, given the diversity of its membership (Lawler, 589).
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORDIC MODEL
While it seems unrealistic that the Nordic model will beconle dominant, tllls does not mean that one should forget the traditional strength and flexibility of the Scandinavian model, not should one think that membership and the mere presence of the EU will not change the Scandinavian model at all, as it is evident that some changes have already been affected:
Even so, the defenders of the folkhelm must see continuing cause for concern. The future remains unclear, but it is not inconceivable that Bildt's radical vision of the EU as a Trojan horse, instrumental in the emergence of a post-social democratic Sweden, may yet be realized not only in Sweden but also across Scandinavia. Public disquiet notwithstanding, the shift towards a variant of a Europe-wide social liberalism throughout Scandinavia appears inexorable, given the powerful logics of rationalization driving it and the evidence of incremental policy changes in a neoliberal direction in all of the Scandinavian states. As argued above, Sweden provides a particularly stark example of how the debate about Europe has contributed to the erosion of the very social consensus that has underpinned the historical development of Scandinavian social democracy (Lawler, (589) (590) .
Furthermore, if one looks at the actual models comparing the new, growing, global captured in the metaphor offolkhelm (Lawler, 583) .
Avoiding a turn away from the model has been a concern of the government since the 1970's when the Swedish economy suffered a severe downturn. Out of the recognition of a need to cope with global econOlnic changes, while still maintaining its core values and structure, came the Swedish third way or °Hcdjc VilgC115 Politik: "What analysts and policy makers from both sides of the political spectrum now agreed upon was that the SAP governments had tailed to tackle economic decline while preserving the core features of the exceptional state" (Lawler, 584) . The question then is, can Sweden still find this third way in light of its membership in the European Union and the Monetary Union, or will the forces of globalization force Sweden and the rest of the Nordic community into the golden straight jacket? While it is too early to tell, one can make projections based upon historical examples and by testing the rival models to see if they are at all compatible.
Furthermore, if one looks at the actual models comparing the new, growing, global Rival Models to Capitalism system to the ideals that represent the Scandinavian m odel w hich have already been o utlined in this paper, one can see where the dashes in policy are evident. The Scandinavian m odel requires heavy goverml1ent involvem ent in the economy, and a broad social safety net w hich is not tied to the m arket. T he importance of this latter part is that it affects the entire Scandinavian outlook on working, in that one is seen as havi ng value to the society o utside of on e's specific work output:
'Political citizenship' must precede 'social citizenship', and these are in turn indispensable for the third stage 'economic citizenship'. Wo rkers must be emancipated tro m social insecurity before they can partake efiectively in economic dem ocracy (Byrkj efl o t, 29) .
By distancing social programs from o nes work output levels, the Scandinavian m odel is distancing itself trom the 'Golden Straigacket' ideals of neo-liberalism . However, there are many breaks between the two, but the distancing of work o utput from social rewa rds and services is large because it strikes at the heart of the difle rence between the Scandinavian econom y and the em erging world model of market driven economics: the Scandinavian model is simply more egalitarian. If one looks at the Sca ndinavian model, one will see that at its base is an ideal of cooperati on and inner-finn conul1urucati on that strikes at the heart of th e globalization ideal of competition:
Another development, starting with distribution economics, buyer relations and purchasing, later became the field of m aterials administration o r logistics. The idea behind this concept was the greater potential for effi ciency and effectiveness could be gained between rather than within firms. Increased bridging in inter-firm coordination would lead to a need for less buffering like stockpiling and smoothing (Lorange, 140) .
In short, these last two concepts of cooperati on and distancing welfare benefits from one's working ability, fl y in the face of current economic practice, however they do not necessarily represent a systern that will fail on the global spectrum.
Much like how there is a differen ce between German business and American business, ye t there is no real comparati ve institutional advantage to either o ne, this can also be said ab o ut the global and Scandinavian models. While the global model creates rapid growth and oppo rtunity, the Scandinavian m odel h elps to lift the entire country up, spreading profit and tying the w hole nati o n together as one cohesive group. This creates a system in which rewards are spread across the board and the society as a w hole grows with the state. This o nce again brings us back to the o ri ginal author, Migdal, and his explanation for why the Scandinavian model could succeed on the international level seems adequate. The original argument of strong state involvem ent in molding the society fits when one takes into account that the entire Scandinavian model is based upon an egalitarian movement of the state and society together as a whole, with the state serving as the driving actor to ensure the cohesiveness and the equality of the society. In light of Migdal however, one can see where the risks from EU membership arises. Apart from possible inunigration from no nScandinavian m ember nations that m ay affect the overall perform ance of their economies, the Scandinavian countries are threatened by the divisio ns w hich EU membership creates. As Lawler points o ut, the debate alo ne to join the EU caused rifts in the society and political parties that were previo usly uncharacteristic if not unheard of in Scandinavian society: 30 ROBBIE BLOCK Pitzer College system to the ideals that represent the Scandinavian m odel w hich have already been o utlined in this paper, one can see where the dashes in policy are evident. The Scandinavian m odel requires heavy goverml1ent involvem ent in the economy, and a broad social safety net w hich is not tied to the m arket. T he importance of this latter part is that it affects the entire Scandinavian outlook on working, in that one is seen as havi ng value to the society o utside of on e's specific work output:
Much like how there is a differen ce between German business and American business, ye t there is no real comparati ve institutional advantage to either o ne, this can also be said ab o ut the global and Scandinavian models. While the global model creates rapid growth and oppo rtunity, the Scandinavian m odel h elps to lift the entire country up, spreading profit and tying the w hole nati o n together as one cohesive group. This creates a system in which rewards are spread across the board and the society as a w hole grows with the state. This o nce again brings us back to the o ri ginal author, Migdal, and his explanation for why the Scandinavian model could succeed on the international level seems adequate. The original argument of strong state involvem ent in molding the society fits when one takes into account that the entire Scandinavian model is based upon an egalitarian movement of the state and society together as a whole, with the state serving as the driving actor to ensure the cohesiveness and the equality of the society. In light of Migdal however, one can see where the risks from EU membership arises. Apart from possible inunigration from no nScandinavian m ember nations that m ay affect the overall perform ance of their economies, the Scandinavian countries are threatened by the divisio ns w hich EU membership creates. As Lawler points o ut, the debate alo ne to join the EU caused rifts in the society and political parties that were previo usly uncharacteristic if not unheard of in Scandinavian society:
The EU debate has been instrumental in the further development of social cleavages which serve to undermine the public consensus upon which the development of Swedish social democracy has historically depended. This was iliustrJted not least by the paucity and brevity of the debate itself. Furthermore, the 1991 elections showed that Bildt's reform programme disproportionately appealed to men, especially young men. Women, who constitute the majority of public-sector workforce and are its primary clients, were more likely to support the parties long associated with the folkhelm or, altenutively, the redgreen left (Lawler, 585).
The development of new social cleavages has brought on by debate seems to be one of the biggest risks for the success of the Scandinavian model , which relies so much on unity and a shared sense of purpose. However, while the model may be under pressure trom its internal reformists, as well as the external global markets, one must l' emember that the model is strong, because at its base is the entire society, and if the society can resist the pressures to split apart, then the model should survive in the new global markets. However, the real threats to the Scandinavian Inodel are the internal rifts which strike at the heart of the model's strength: its societal unity. If the country's social unity decreases, and rifts are formed and groups begin to challenge the state, than it will fit into Migdal's model of a strong society budding against the state which ultimately fails. Thus it is important when considering the future of Scandinavian exceptionalism to remember that the real threat is not external pressures, but the internal cleavages which they create.
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